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Abstract—This paper is concerned with the general multiple
access wiretap channel (MAC-WT) and the existence of codes that
accomplish reliability and strong secrecy. Information leakage to
the eavesdropper is assessed by the variational distance metric,
whereas the average error probability is bounded by modifying
Feinstein’s Lemma. We derive an achievable strong secrecy rate
region by utilizing the resolvability theory for the multiple-access
channel in terms of information-spectrum methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
The multiple access wiretap channel involves transmissions
from multiple sources to a single destination under the pres-
ence of an unauthorized node. Achievable rates are supported
by codes that offer vanishingly small error probability at the
legitimate receiver and vanishingly small information leakage
to the eavesdropper. When the multiple access dimension is
separated from the wiretap dimension, well known charac-
terizations of capacity are available for both specialized and
abstract channel settings [1]. More precisely, the seminal work
of Wyner [2], Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] laid the foundations for
the analysis of the wiretap channel using information-theoretic
tools and proved the existence of coding schemes that achieve
reliability and secrecy when rates are confined to the secrecy
capacity region. The capacity region of the multiple access
channel was extensively studied in [4], [5].
During the last decades many communication models have
been investigated [6], [7], [8] using the notion of channel
capacity as basis for the development of coding schemes.
Recently, the authors in [9] showed that capacity based codes
have many limitations and cannot provide strong secrecy
results. On the other hand, information spectrum methods as
laid out in Hayashi [10] and Han [11], [12] demonstrate that
there is a connection between wiretap coding and channel
resolvability which can lead to strong secrecy results. The
idea behind channel-resolvability based constructions is to use
a codebook to control the statistical distribution induced at
the output of a noisy channel and the objective is to approx-
imate the eavesdropper’s observation by drawing codewords
uniformly at random from a codebook. Based on this concept
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various communication models have been investigated [9],
[13], [14] with the strong secrecy requirement as introduced
by Maurer [15].
In this paper, we derive regions of achievable rate pairs for
the general multiple-access wiretap channel (MAC-WT) under
the strong secrecy criterion. We use the variational distance
metric in order to prove statistical independence between the
transmitted messages and the eavesdropper distribution, while
reliability is provided by modifying Feinstein’s Lemma [16].
Our main result is valid for general channels with abstract
alphabets as the proof is based on Steinberg’s multiple-access
channel (MAC) resolvability theory [17] and thus can be
applied in both a discrete and continuous environment making
no common and restrictive assumptions such as stationarity,
ergodicity and memory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the model and formulates the problem. In Section III
we first introduce some basic prerequisites and then we prove
the main theorem highlighting the reliability and information
leakage analysis. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
Notation: We represent random variables with capital letters.
Sample values are denoted with lower case letters x; they take
values in alphabets X which can be arbitrary sets. We use
bold upper case letters such as X to denote random vectors.
We write pY¯ to express the approximated output distribution
of a channel resulting from input X¯ chosen from code Cn.
Also we use the notation x1(i, j) and x
(1)
ij interchangeably
for readability purposes.
II. MULTIPLE ACCESS WIRETAP CHANNEL AND CODING
SCHEME
Two users wish to send messages to a legitimate receiver
reliably with no errors and simultaneously ensure no leak-
age to a potential eavesdropper. More precisely, transmis-
sion over the MAC-WT, involves two arbitrary input alpha-
bets X1,X2, two arbitrary output alphabets Y,Z and a se-
quence of transition probabilities {pY Z|X1X2}n≥1. The chan-
nels (X1,X2, p(y|x1, x2),Y) and (X1,X2, p(z|x1, x2),Z) are
called the main and the eavesdropper’s channel, respectively.
A (enR1 , enR2 , n) wiretap coding scheme Cn for the MAC-
WT channel consists of:
• two private message sets M1 = {1, . . . , e
nR1} and
M2 = {1, . . . , e
nR2},
• two auxiliary message sets M′1 = {1, . . . , e
nR′1} and
M′2 = {1, . . . , e
nR′2}, which are used to randomize the
transmission of the private messages,
• two stochastic encoders with mappings φ1 :M1×M
′
1 →
Xn1 and φ2 :M2 ×M
′
2 → X
n
2 ,
• and a decoder ψn : Y
n →M1 ×M
′
1 ×M2 ×M
′
2.
The reliability performance of the code is evaluated by the
probability of error, where we require correct decoding at
the legitimate receiver for both the actual and the auxiliary
message and is defined as
Pe(Cn) = P ({(Mˆ1, Mˆ2, Mˆ
′
1, Mˆ
′
2)
6= (M1,M2,M
′
1,M
′
2)|Cn}).
Ideally, perfect secrecy obtains when knowledge of the obser-
vation vector Z ∈ Zn at the eavesdropper offers no clues
about the transmitted messages M1 ∈ M1, M2 ∈ M2.
Perfect secrecy conditions are asymptotically met provided
the relative entropy D(pM1M2Z||pM1M2pZ) goes to zero as
n→∞. Here we will assess the amount of leaked information
to the eavesdropper by the second strongest secrecy metric [9]
defined in terms of the variational distance.
L(Cn) = V (pM1M2Z, pM1M2pZ).
Where V is the variational distance between two distributions
V (P,Q) = 2 sup
A∈F
|P (A)−Q(A)|
Based on the above, we call a pair (R1, R2) achievable if there
exists a sequence of codes such that the
• limn→∞ Pe(Cn) = 0,
• limn→∞ L(Cn) = 0.
The strongly secure achievable rate region of the general
MAC-WT channel is characterized in the next section.
III. ACHIEVABILITY OF THE MAC-WT CHANNEL
The achievable rate region of the MAC-WT channel is de-
scribed in terms of information density and spectrum concepts.
These are defined next.
A. Information-spectrum theory
The information density between X and Y is the random
variable
i(X ;Y ) = log
pXY (XY )
pX(X)pY (Y )
and the conditional information density of X , Y given Z is
defined as
i(X ;Y |Z) = log
pXY |Z(X,Y |Z)
pX|Z(X |Z)pY |Z(Y |Z)
.
The mean of the above variables is the usual mutual infor-
mation, i.e. I(X ;Y ) = EXY [i(X ;Y )] and I(X ;Y |Z) =
EXY Z [i(X ;Y |Z)]. If X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y =
(Y1, . . . , Yn) denote random vectors of dimension n, the
distribution of the random variable 1
n
i(X;Y) is called the
information spectrum [11] of pXY . The asymptotic regime is
described by the sup-information rate
i¯(X;Y) = p - lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(X;Y)
= inf{α : lim
n→∞
P [
1
n
i(X;Y) > α] = 0},
and the inf-information rate
¯
i(X;Y) = p - lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(X;Y)
= sup{β : lim
n→∞
P [
1
n
i(X;Y) < β] = 0}.
We are now ready to present the main result of this paper.
Theorem: The achievable rate region under the strong secrecy
criterion for the general MAC-WT is
RSS =


R1 ≤ p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(X1;Y|X2)
− p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(X1;Z)− 4γ
R2 ≤ p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(X2;Y|X1)
− p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(X2;Z)− 4γ
R1 +R2 ≤ p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(X1X2;Y)
− p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(X1X2;Z)− 4γ
where γ is a positive arbitrary constant.
Remark: In [13] Yassaee and Aref, use output statistics
approximation techniques to obtain the same rate region for
the MAC-WT. However, their result is confined to discrete
memoryless channels as it is based on typicality. In this paper
achievability is established for a broader class of channels that
includes both discrete and continuous channel and without
memory constraints.
The proof of the above theorem proceeds in a number
of steps. First we analyze achievability by working out
the attributes that shape the probability of error. Then we
demonstrate that in addition the strong secrecy criterion is
valid. More precisely, consider a rate pair (R1, R2) satisfying
the inequalities given in the theorem. We show that there
is a sequence of codes with asymptotically vanishing error
probability and leakage.
B. Reliability analysis
We construct a coding scheme with the following structure:
Codebook generation: We generate M1M
′
1 codewords inde-
pendently and at random by generating ⌈enR1⌉⌈enR
′
1⌉ i.i.d.
sequences xn1 (m1) with m1 = (i, j) ∈ M1 ×M
′
1 according
to pX1 . Similarly we generate the codewords for the second
user.
Encoding: To transmit m1 = (i, j) ∈ M1 × M
′
1, where i
is the actual message and j is the auxiliary message, user 1
computes xn1 (m1) and send it over the channel. User 2 acts
in the same way.
Decoding: For arbitrary γ > 0 we define the sets
T n1 = {(x1,x2,y) :
1
n
log
pY|X1X2(y|x1,x2)
pY|X2(y|x2)
>
1
n
logM1M
′
1 + γ
}
,
T n2 = {(x1,x2,y) :
1
n
log
pY|X1X2(y|x1,x2)
pY|X1(y|x1)
>
1
n
logM2M
′
2 + γ
}
,
T n12 = {(x1,x2,y) :
1
n
log
pY|X1X2(y|x1,x2)
pY(y)
>
1
n
(logM1M2 + logM
′
1M
′
2)
+ γ
}
and T n = T n1 ∩ T
n
2 ∩ T
n
12.
After receiving a y ∈ Yn, the threshold decoder ψn searches
for messages m1,m2 and their corresponding indices which
satisfy (x1(m1),x2(m2), y
n) ∈ T n. If such a tuple exists and
is unique the decoder outputs ψn(y) = (mˆ1, mˆ2), otherwise
declares an error.
The analysis of the error probability relies on standard
arguments. The following Lemma provides conditions for reli-
able communication between the two users and the legitimate
receiver.
Lemma 1: If
0 ≤ R1 +R
′
1 ≤ p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(X1;Y|X2)− 2γ
0 ≤ R2 +R
′
2 ≤ p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(X2;Y|X1)− 2γ
0 ≤ R1 +R2 +R
′
1 +R
′
2 ≤ p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(X1X2;Y)− 2γ,
then limn→∞ E[Pe(Cn)] = 0.
Proof. In order to prove that for the any rate pairs which
comply with the above inequalities, Pe(Cn) → 0 for large
n, we consider the multi-user version of Feinstein’s Lemma
[16], [11] and modify it properly so that includes the auxiliary
message rates. This is necessary since the legitimate receiver
has to decode the auxiliary random message as well. More
precisely the following Lemma holds.
Lemma 2: Let X1, X2 be an arbitrary pair of channel
inputs and Y is the channel output from a MAC. Then for
arbitrary positive integers M1,M2,M
′
1,M
′
2, there exists an
(M1,M2,M
′
1,M
′
2, n)-code satisfying
Pe(Cn) ≤ P
{
1
n
i(X1;Y|X2) ≤
1
n
logM1M
′
1 + γ
}
+ P
{
1
n
i(X2;Y|X1) ≤
1
n
logM2M
′
2 + γ
}
+ P
{
1
n
i(X1X2;Y) ≤
1
n
(logM1M2 + logM
′
1M
′
2)
+ γ
}
+ 5e−nγ .
for all n and arbitrary γ > 0.
We provide a sketch of the proof only; the full details follow
the same line of arguments with those employed for the simple
MAC case in [11, Theorem 7.7]. First we define the event
Eijkl = (x1(i, j),x2(k, l),y) ∈ T
n
Ecijkl stands for the complement. Using the symmetry of
the random code construction, the average error probability
E[Pe(Cn)] is equal to the error probability of a random
codeword transmission. Without loss of generality, we assume
that user 1 and user 2 send x1(1, 1) and x2(1, 1), respectively.
Therefore the error probability is upper bounded as follows:
E[Pe(Cn)] = P{E
c
1111
⋃
(i′j′k′l′)
6=
(1111)
Ei′j′k′l′}
≤ P{Ec1111}+
∑
i′ 6=1
P{Ei′111}+
∑
j′ 6=1
P{E1j′11}
+
∑
k′ 6=1
P{E11k′1}+
∑
l′ 6=1
P{E111l′}+
∑
(i′j′k′l′)
6=
(1111)
P{Ei′j′k′l′}
(1)
Each of the terms appearing above can be handled in a manner
similar to [11, Theorem 7.7]. For instance, the first summand
is bounded as follows
P{Ei′111} =
∑
(x1,x2,y)∈T n
pX1(x1)pX2Y(x2,y)
≤
∑
(x1,x2,y)∈T n1
pX1(x1)pX2Y(x2,y).
(2)
Also, for (x1,x2,y) ∈ T
n
1
pX2Y(x2,y) ≤ pX2(x2)pY|X1X2(y|x1x2)
e−nγ
M1
(3)
and eq.(1) leads to
P{Ei′111}
≤
∑
(x1,x2,y)∈T n1
pX1(x1)pX2(x2)pY|X1X2(y|x1x2)
e−nγ
M1
≤
e−nγ
M1
,
(4)
and finally we obtain
∑
i′ 6=1 P{Ei′111} ≤ e
−nγ . Similarly we
can bound the other terms and by substituting into eq. (1) we
get
E[Pe(Cn)] ≤ P{E
c
1111}+ 5e
−nγ
where the first term is trivial. According to this we conclude
that there must exist at least one (M1,M2,M
′
1,M
′
2, n)-code
satisfying the condition of Lemma 2 and any information and
auxiliary rate pair satisfying Lemma 1 is achievable. Hence,
for arbitrary (R1, R2) and (R
′
1, R
′
2) and a small constant
γ > 0 we define Mi = e
n(Ri−2γ) and M ′i = e
n(R′i−2γ)
for i = 1, 2 and Lemma 2 guarantees the existence of an
(M1,M2,M
′
1,M
′
2, n)-code satisfying
Pe(Cn) ≤ P
{
1
n
i(X1;Y|X2) ≤ R1 +R
′
1 − 3γ
}
+ P
{
1
n
i(X2;Y|X1) ≤ R2 +R
′
2 − 3γ
}
+ P
{
1
n
i(X1X2;Y) ≤ R1 +R
′
1 +R2 +R
′
2
− 7γ
}
+ 5e−nγ .
Because the definitions of spectral inf-information rates imply
that all the terms of the RHS converge to zero as n→∞ then
lim
n→∞
E[Pe(Cn)] = 0.
C. Secrecy Analysis
We next analyze the code performance in terms of informa-
tion leakage. The following Lemma identifies the constraints
on the rates of local randomness needed to asymptotically
eliminate leakage.
Lemma 3: If the rate pair satisfies
R′1 ≥ p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(X1;Z) + 2γ
R′2 ≥ p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(X2;Z) + 2γ
R′1 +R
′
2 ≥ p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(X1X2;Z) + 2γ
(5)
then limn→∞ E[L(Cn)] = 0.
Proof. Let Z¯ denote the random vector received by the eaves-
dropper if X1, X2 are i.i.d distributed according to pX1(x1),
pX2(x2). We can bound the variational distance between
pM1M2Z and pM1M2pZ as follows
L(Cn) = V (pM1M2Z¯, pM1M2pZ¯)
= EM1M2 [V (pZ¯|M1M2 , pZ¯)]
≤ EM1M2 [V (pZ¯|M1M2 , pZ) + V (pZ, pZ¯)]
≤ 2EM1M2 [V (pZ¯|M1M2 , pZ)].
(6)
Furthermore if we average over all possible codewords and use
the symmetry of the random coding construction, we obtain
E[L(Cn)] ≤ 2E[V (pZ¯|M1=1M2=1, pZ)] (7)
where the output distribution is given by
pZ¯|11(z) =
1
M ′1M
′
2
M ′1∑
j=1
M ′2∑
l=1
pZ|X1X2(z|x1(1, j),x2(1, l))
(8)
To ensure asymptotic decay of L(Cn) to zero, it suffices to
establish that each of the sub-codebooks {x1(i, j)}j∈M ′1 and
{x2(k, l)}l∈M ′2 are channel resolvability codes [6], [11]. The
proof of this claim relies on the following known inequality.
Lemma 4: [11] For any µ > 0 and any two distributions P ,Q
V (P,Q) ≤ 2µ+ 2P
{
log
P (X)
Q(X)
> µ
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Jµ
where P , Q are distributed over X .
Guided by the above Lemma we define Jµ for any µ > 0 as
follows,
Jµ =
∑
x
(1)
11 ∈X
n
1
. . .
∑
x
(1)
1M′
1
∈Xn1
∑
x
(2)
11 ∈X
n
2
. . .
∑
x
(2)
1M′
2
∈Xn2
pX1(x
(1)
11 ) . . .
pX1(x
(1)
1M ′1
)pX2(x
(2)
11 ) . . . pX2(x
(2)
1M ′2
)
×
∑
z∈Zn
pZ¯|11(z)1
{
log
pZ¯|11(z)
pZ(z)
> µ
}
(9)
and we show that for any µ > 0; Jµ → 0 [17]. Indeed,
Jµ =
∑
x
(1)
11 ∈X
n
1
. . .
∑
x
(1)
1M′
1
∈Xn1
∑
x
(2)
11 ∈X
n
2
. . .
∑
x
(2)
1M′
2
∈Xn2
pX1(x
(1)
11 ) . . .
pX1(x
(1)
1M ′1
)pX2(x
(2)
11 ) . . . pX2(x
(2)
1M ′2
)
×
∑
z∈Zn
M ′1∑
j=1
M ′2∑
l=1
1
M ′1M
′
2
pZ|X1X2(z|x1(1, j),x2(1, l))
× 1
{∑M ′1
j=1
∑M ′2
l=1 pZ|X1X2(z|x1(1, j),x2(1, l))
M ′1M
′
2pZ(z)
> eµ
}
=
∑
x
(1)
12 ∈X
n
1
. . .
∑
x
(1)
1M′
1
∈Xn1
∑
x
(2)
12 ∈X
n
2
. . .
∑
x
(2)
1M′
2
∈Xn2
pX1(x
(1)
12 ) . . .
pX1(x
(1)
1M ′1
)pX2(x
(2)
12 ) . . . pX2(x
(2)
1M ′2
)
×
∑
x
(1)
11 ∈X
n
1
∑
x
(2)
11 ∈X
n
2
∑
z∈Zn
pX1X2Z(x
(1)
11 ,x
(2)
11 , z)
× 1
{
pZ|X1X2(z|x1(1, 1),x2(1, 1))
M ′1M
′
2pZ(z)
+
∑
(j,l) 6=(1,1) pZ|X1X2(z|x1(1, j),x2(1, l))
M ′1M
′
2pZ(z)
> eµ
}
(10)
where the last equality exploits symmetry. Moreover, from
eq.(10) we obtain eq. (11) on the top of the next page, where
τ = 14 (e
µ − 1). Taking the expectation we obtain
Jµ ≤ J1 + J2 + J3 + J4 (12)
Jµ =
∑
x
(1)
12 ∈X
n
1
. . .
∑
x
(1)
1M′
1
∈Xn1
∑
x
(2)
12 ∈X
n
2
. . .
∑
x
(2)
1M′
2
∈Xn2
pX1(x
(1)
12 ) . . . pX1(x
(1)
1M ′1
)pX2(x
(2)
12 ) . . . pX2(x
(2)
1M ′2
)
×
∑
x
(1)
11 ∈X
n
1
∑
x
(2)
11 ∈X
n
2
∑
z∈Zn
pX1X2Z(x
(1)
11 ,x
(2)
11 , z)1
{
1
M ′1M
′
2
exp(i(x
(1)
11 x
(2)
11 ; z)) +
1
M ′1M
′
2
∑
(j,l) 6=(1,1)
exp(i(x
(1)
1j x
(2)
1l ; z)) > 1 + 4τ
}
≤
∑
x
(1)
12 ∈X
n
1
. . .
∑
x
(1)
1M′
1
∈Xn1
∑
x
(2)
12 ∈X
n
2
. . .
∑
x
(2)
1M′
2
∈Xn2
pX1(x
(1)
12 ) . . . pX1(x
(1)
1M ′1
)pX2(x
(2)
12 ) . . . pX2(x
(2)
1M ′2
)
×
∑
x
(1)
11 ∈X
n
1
∑
x
(2)
11 ∈X
n
2
∑
z∈Zn
pX1X2Z(x
(1)
11 , x
(2)
11 , z)
{
1
{
1
M ′1M
′
2
exp(i(x
(1)
11 x
(2)
11 ; z)) > τ
}
+ 1
{
1
M ′1M
′
2
∑
j 6=1
exp(i(x
(1)
1j x
(2)
11 ; z)) > τ
}
+ 1
{
1
M ′1M
′
2
∑
l 6=1
exp(i(x
(1)
11 x
(2)
1l ; z)) > τ
}
+ 1
{
1
M ′1M
′
2
∑
(j,l) 6=(1,1)
exp(i(x
(1)
1j x
(2)
1l ; z)) > 1 + τ
}}
(11)
where
J1 = P
{
1
M ′1M
′
2
exp(i(X1X2;Z)) > τ
}
J2 = P
{
1
M ′1M
′
2
M ′1∑
j=1
exp(i(X1(1, j)X2;Z)) > τ
}
J3 = P
{
1
M ′1M
′
2
M ′2∑
l=1
exp(i(X1X2(1, l);Z)) > τ
}
J4 = P
{
1
M ′1M
′
2
M ′1∑
j=1
M ′2∑
l=1
exp(i(X1(1, j)X2(1, l);Z))
> 1 + τ
}
,
Application of similar steps to those developed in [17] allows
us to conclude that each one the terms Ji, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, go
to zero, if the auxiliary rate pairs satisfy the inequalities of
Lemma 3. Finally, convergence of Jµ to zero in conjunction
with Lemma 4 prove the claim.
Finally, combining the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3
and performing Fourier-Motzkin elimination for the auxiliary
rates R′1, R
′
2 we obtain the achievable rate region of the main
Theorem.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper achievability has been studied for strongly
secure communication in a MAC-WT. Thanks to the
information-spectrum methods adopted in this work, there is
no need for assumptions such as stationarity, ergodicity and
memorylessness. Moreover we obtained generalized results
which can be useful to specific applications. Extensions that
include relay nodes as well as specialized settings are consid-
ered in forthcoming work.
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